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Abstract
External price benchmarking imposes a price cap for pharmaceuti-
cals based on prices of identical products in other countries. Suppose
that a regulatory agency can either directly negotiate drug prices with
pharmaceutical manufacturers or implement a benchmarking regime
based on foreign prices. Using a model where two countries differ only
in their market size, we show that a country prefers benchmarking
if its agency has considerably less bargaining power compared to the
agency in the other country. Assuming that bargaining power is pos-
itively correlated to country size, we find that only small countries
might have an incentive to engage in external price benchmarking.
This incentive shrinks if population size grows.
Keywords: Pharmaceuticals, price negotiation, administered prices, exter-
nal reference pricing.
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1 Introduction
Nearly all countries in the industrialized world regulate the market for phar-
maceutical products. There is a widespread agreement that an unregulated
market would not lead to a socially desirable outcome: neither in terms of
safety nor in the access to life-saving drugs.
The pharmaceutical market differs from other markets in some important
respects. Most high-potency drugs are available only by prescription: that is,
the consumer of a prescription drug and the consumption decision-maker—
the prescribing physician—are not the same person. Moreover, the range of
drugs is so vast and complex that few physicians can fully inform themselves
about all the available alternatives.1 Most governments, therefore, recognize
that information failures require regulation in terms of drug safety and ther-
apeutical efficacy. Many go further by reimbursing prescription drug outlays
on the grounds that the access to life-enhancing drugs should not depend
on the ability to pay. This, however, means that patients are often not only
removed from product decision-making, but also from paying the full price
associated with their drug consumption.
The combination of physician decision-making, imperfect information,
and third-party reimbursement makes drug demand stronger and less price-
elastic than it might otherwise be, conferring considerable market power upon
the sellers of well-accepted drugs (Scherer, 1993). This has led many countries
to regulate prices and to control for over-prescription and inappropriate use
of pharmaceutical products. In spite of the wide variety of existing regulatory
regimes, we can broadly distinguish two types of drug price regulation.2
• External price benchmarking, according to which the price of a drug
at market entry is based on the price of the same drug in a group of
reference countries, and
1To give an example: by the end of 2008 a total of 16’247 pharmaceutical products—
counting different pharmaceutical forms, dosages, and pack sizes—has been registered in
Switzerland. Data from Interpharma (2009).
2Danzon (1997a) provides an excellent overview of various regulatory mechanisms in
the pharmaceutical industry. Cross-national impacts of pharmaceutical price regulation is
analyzed in a recent OECD report (2008). For a more detailed discussion of the pharma-
ceutical market in Switzerland, see Paris and Docteur (2007).
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• Direct price negotiations, according to which the price of a drug at
market entry is the outcome of a bargaining process between the man-
ufacturer and a regulatory agency.
External price benchmarking is the most widely used technique to regulate
pharmaceutical prices in European countries (OECD, 2008). In essence, this
technique consists of a price cap for a new drug, based on the price for
the same drug in a basket of reference countries.3 The basic procedure can
be summarized as follows. Upon the launch of a drug in a country, the
manufacturer submits a price proposal to the authorizing agency. The agency
then compares the proposed price with the retail price of the same drug in
reference countries. The drug is not approved if the proposed price exceeds
the average price in the reference countries by more than a certain amount.
Of course, external price benchmarking does not provide a strong basis
for price regulation in first- or early-launch countries. Hence, in these coun-
tries the drug price must be determined in a negotiation process with the
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Such negotiations are characterized by the
difficult task of assessing the degree of differentiation and the level of sub-
stitutability between a new drug and already authorized drugs in the same
area of therapeutic practice.
In this paper we analyze the incentives for a country to engage in external
price benchmarking as opposed to direct price negotiations. Using a game-
theoretical model where two countries differ only in their market size, we
show that small countries are more likely to engage in external price bench-
marking than big countries. This result can be explained by the fact that a
small country has less resources to finance its regulatory agency than a big
country. Due to a positive correlation between budget size and negotiating
skills, the agency in the small country is assumed to have comparatively little
bargaining power; however, the implementation of an external benchmarking
policy allows a free ride on the superior negotiating skills in the big country.
3In general, reference countries are selected according to either economic and/or geo-
graphic proximity. For instance, Switzerland benchmarks its price for reimbursed drugs
against prices in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom; cf. OECD (2008).
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We find that not only small countries may profit from external price
benchmarking, but also pharmaceutical firms. One of the reasons for this
result is the fact that the implementation of a benchmarking policy in one
country results in a change of the bargaining problem in the other country,
which then becomes the country of reference. The idea is that the profits ac-
crued in the first country become part of the “bargaining pie;” this reinforces
the implicit negotiation power of the firm when negotiating the drug price
in the reference country since the disagreement payoff of the firm is higher
when two countries rather than one are concerned by the negotiation.
A Brief Overview of the Model. We consider a simple model with two
countries. A pharmaceutical firm produces a prescription drug that can be
sold in both countries. The countries are at the same level of development,
but of different size: this means that, except for a scaling factor, the demand
functions are identical. Obviously, the firm would like to charge the same
monopoly price in both countries,4 but in order to be authorized for sale
the drug’s price has to be approved by regulatory agencies. In doing so, the
agencies may be bound to a policy of either external price benchmarking
(EPB) or direct price negotiations (DPN). In each country the regulation
policy is defined beforehand by the national legislator.
The sequence of actions is a follows. First, in both countries, the legislator
defines the regulatory policy for his agency. Second, the manufacturer decides
on the optimal timing to launch the drug in the two countries. Third, the
drug launch occurs and price negotiations take place when necessary. A
negotiation process is modeled as a Nash bargaining game between the firm
and an agency. We assume that the agency in the big country has more
bargaining power compared to the agency in the small country: hence, if both
countries negotiate independently with the firm, then the drug is cheaper in
the big country.
We first show that total profits are higher under external price bench-
marking than under independent price negotiations. This suggests that,
whenever possible, the firm will decide on a product launch strategy that
4Note that the size of a country has only a level effect on the maximization problem of
the monopolists; thus, the monopoly price is identical in both countries.
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enables an EPB policy to be applied. In particular, the firm wants the big
country to regulate its drug price based on the negotiated price in the small
country. However, such a move is not part of the equilibrium path since EPB
is a weakly dominated strategy for the big country.
While the big country never implements an EPB policy, the small coun-
try will do so in equilibrium if its agency has considerably less bargaining
power than its counterpart in the big country. If this is the case, then the
equilibrium path has the following structure. At the outset of the game, the
legislator in the big country decides on a DPN policy while the legislator
in the small country decides on an EPB policy. The firm then decides to
launch the drug first in the big country, followed by introduction in the small
country. As a result, the drug price for both countries is determined through
a Nash bargaining game between the firm and the agency in the big country.
Related Literature. The economic literature on pharmaceutical price reg-
ulation is mainly empirical, focusing on measuring cross-national price dif-
ferences and explaining them by the regulatory environment.5 Danzon and
Chao (2000) find that countries with strict price regulation—like France,
Italy, and Japan—have lower prices than the less regulated markets of the
United States and the United Kingdom. However, Berndt (2000) provides a
number of caveats about their interpretation of their data.
In a more recent paper, Kyle (2007) examines the impact of price regu-
lation on the extent and the timing of drug launch. She finds two results:
first, drugs developed by firms headquartered in countries that regulate prices
reach fewer markets than products that originate in countries without price
control; second, companies delay launch into price-controlled markets, and
are less likely to introduce their products in additional markets after entering
a country with low prices.6 Kyle’s findings are in line with our theoretical
predictions. We find that in equilibrium a pharmaceutical firm will launch a
5The literature is extensively surveyed by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000)
and Danzon (2000). However, as Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy complain, the bulk
of the literature is mainly descriptive and only few studies examine the effects of external
price benchmarking in the grounds of some sort of theoretical model.
6Other papers with similar conclusions are Danzon, Wang, and Wang (2005) and Dan-
zon and Furukawa (2008).
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new drug first in a big country that is not engaged in external price bench-
marking, followed by introduction in a small country that does regulate prices
based on foreign prices.
Despite a substantial empirical literature, there are few theoretical papers
on pharmaceutical price regulation. Notable exception are the papers by
Danzon (1997b), Wright (2004), and Mariñoso, Jelovac, and Olivella (2008).
The last one is specifically relevant for our purpose. Mariñoso et al. use
a model where two countries differ only in their population size and the
reimbursement level for prescription drugs. They show that a country has
an incentive to engage in external price benchmarking if its reimbursement
level is higher as compared to that in the other country. This preference
dwindles as the size of the country engaging in benchmarking increases.
Our setup is related to Mariñoso et al. (2008), but the driving force to
engage in external benchmarking is the difference in bargaining power, rather
than the difference in reimbursement levels. Moreover, we explicitly model
the decision whether or not to engage in external price benchmarking.
This paper is also connected to the literature on parallel trade and reim-
ports of pharmaceutical products.7 The closest paper to our contribution
is Pecorino (2002), who studies the potential effect of drug reimports from
Canada to the United States. Usually, prescription drugs are much cheaper
in Canada due to the single payer system which allows the Canadian govern-
ment to exercise monopsony power in setting prices. Using a stylized model
of the North American drug market, Pecorino shows that, surprisingly, the
presence of parallel imports results in higher profits for pharmaceutical firms.
We show in our model that the presence of external price benchmarking has a
similar effect. The present model can be interpreted as a generalized version
of Pecorino’s: the structure becomes the same if we restrict the bargaining
power of one country to zero. Hence, our model corroborates the statement
made by Danzon (1997b) that pharmaceutical price regulation based on for-
eign prices is equivalent to a system of 100% parallel trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
introduces the general model. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium price
7For a primer on the economics of reimportation of prescription drugs see
Berndt (2007).
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for different regulation policies. We then solve the model in the sections
4 and 5. Section 6 concludes. Computational details are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Model
Our model is based on a game between a pharmaceutical firm and the health
authorities in a big country (A) and a small country (B). Henceforth, we
will refer to this players as the firm and the agencies. In approving a drug
the agencies may either be bound to a policy of external price benchmarking
(EPB) or a policy of direct price negotiations (DPN). These policies are
defined beforehand by two additional players; these players are referred to as
the legislators.
The firm produces a prescription drug that is patent protected in both
countries. The development process of the drug is not explicitly modeled,
but presumably the firm has borne large sunk costs of research and develop-
ment in bringing the drug to market. The marginal costs of production are
normalized to zero.
Assume that the two countries are at a similar level of development, so
that up to a scaling parameter k < 1 demand is the same in both countries.
We say that the big country has size 1 while the small country has size k. To
derive explicit results, we restrict the analysis to linear demand. Aggregated
demand in country A and B are defined as follows:
Q(PA) = 1− PA and k Q(PB) = k(1− PB). (1)
The firm aims at maximizing its profits from sales in both countries, with
Π(PA) = (1− PA)PA and kΠ(PB) = k(1− PB)PB (2)
being the profits in country A and B, respectively. Agencies and legislators
are assumed to care only about the surplus of domestic consumers.8 There-
fore, they strive to maximize the net consumer surplus in country A and B,
8This implies that a country’s objective function does not include the profits of the
firm. We believe this assumption to be appropriate, especially for countries with no
pharmaceutical industry.
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given by
CS(PA) =
(1− PA)
2
2
and k CS(PB) =
k(1− PB)
2
2
. (3)
Although the firm enjoys patent protection in both countries, it cannot act as
a monopolist. To obtain market approval in country i = A,B, the firm must
prove that its product is safe and efficacious for the intended use; in addition,
the drug price must be authorized by the local agency. As mentioned above,
the agency may either be bound to an EPB or a DPN policy.
Under an EPB policy, the agency takes the negotiated price in the other
country as price cap; thus, the drug price in the reference country becomes
the domestic price as well. However, if the drug has not yet been approved
by the other agency—or if the approval was rejected—then the agency can
still negotiate with the pharmaceutical firm directly. In contrast, under a
DPN policy, the agency always negotiate independently with the firm.
We model the negotiation process as a Nash bargaining game between the
firm and an agency. The scenario is one of threats: that is, the negotiating
agency can credibly threaten not to authorize the drug if negotiations fail.
The agencies have different bargaining power, denoted by α ∈ (0, 1) and
β ∈ (0, α), where country A has the more powerful agency because α > β.9
The bargaining power of the firm is 1−α in negotiations with agency A, and
1− β in negotiations with agency B.
Timing. We study the three-stage game illustrated by Figure 1. In the
first stage, the legislators of both countries simultaneously decide on the
price approval policy for their country: they can implement an EPB policy
or a DPN policy. These policies are observed by the pharmaceutical firm,
who in the second stage of the game defines the product launch strategy
for the third stage: that is, it decides whether to launch the drug first in
the big country, followed by introduction in the the small country (strategy
“A/B”), or vice versa (strategy “B/A”).10 In stage three, the drug is launched
9This assumption can be sustained by the fact that a big country has more resources
to finance its authorities than a small country.
10To keep the analysis tractable, we abstract from the possibility of a simultaneous
product launch. However, this simplification is not crucial because a simultaneous product
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Figure 1: Game structure
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Subgame 1. PA is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency A. Agency B is bound to a DPN policy
and hence plays an independent Nash bargain-
ing game with the firm; i.e. PB 6= PA.
Subgame 2. PB is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency B. Agency A is bound to a DPN policy
and hence plays an independent Nash bargain-
ing game with the firm; i.e. PA 6= PB.
Subgame 3. PA is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency A. Agency B is bound to an EPB pol-
icy and thus simply adopts the negotiated price
from country A; i.e. PB = PA.
Subgame 4. PB is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency B. Agency A is bound to a DPN policy
and hence plays an independent Nash bargain-
ing game with the firm; i.e. PA 6= PB.
Subgame 5. PA is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency A. Agency B is bound to a DPN policy
and hence plays an independent Nash bargain-
ing game with the firm; i.e. PB 6= PA.
Subgame 6. PB is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency B. Agency A is bound to an EPB pol-
icy and thus simply adopts the negotiated price
from country B; i.e. PA = PB.
Subgame 7. PA is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency A. Agency B is bound to an EPB pol-
icy and thus simply adopts the negotiated price
from country A; i.e. PB = PA.
Subgame 8. PB is determined through a
Nash bargaining game between the firm and
agency B. Agency A is bound to an EPB pol-
icy and thus simply adopts the negotiated price
from country B; i.e. PA = PB.
EPB
DPN
EPB
DPN
EPB
DPN
B/A
A/B
B/A
A/B
B/A
A/B
B/A
A/B
Stage 1
The legislators of both coun-
tries simultaneously decide on
the price approval policy for
their agency.
Stage 2
The firm defines
the product launch
strategy for the next
stage.
Stage 3
The drug is launched according to the prede-
fined strategy. The agencies approve the drug’s
price by applying their respective policy.
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according to the predefined strategy and price negotiations take place when
necessary.
Henceforth, we will refer to the country in which the drug is launched
first as first-launch country and to the country in which the drug is launched
second as second-launch country.
Note that the drug price in the first-launch country is always determined
through a Nash bargaining game: this price becomes the price for the second-
launch country as well, if the second-launch country is bound to an EPB
policy (and provided that negotiations in the first-launch country were suc-
cessful); otherwise, however, the agency in the second-launch country will
play an independent Nash bargaining game with the firm as well.
We assume that all players are risk neutral and that none of them dis-
counts the future. Therefore, the firm’s expected payoff at the beginning
of the game is just the sum of the expected profits in both countries, i.e.
ΠTotal = Π(PA) + kΠ(PB). The expected payoff of the legislator and the
agency in country A is CS(PA), and similarly, the expected payoff of the leg-
islator and the agency in country B is k CS(PB). We restrict the analysis to
pure strategy equilibria.
3 Third-stage Nash Bargaining Games
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the price approval
process in stage three. The outcome of this process depends on both the
product launch strategy defined by the firm in stage two and, more crucially,
on the regulatory policies defined by the legislators in stage one. As can be
seen from Figure 1, the model has eight third-stage subgames, numbered 1 to
8. These subgames can be classified into two groups: subgames in which the
agency of the second-launch country is bound to a DPN policy, and subgames
in which the agency of the second-launch country is bound to an EPB policy.
Note that each subgame in the first group consists of two independent
Nash bargaining games. Since the outcomes of these Nash games do not
depend on whether A or B is the first launch country, the subgames in
launch would be a weakly dominated strategy.
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the first group are payoff equivalent. Conversely, a subgame in the second
group does only consist of a Nash game with the agency in the first-launch
country. Hence, in this group of subgames the equilibrium payoffs do depend
on whether A or B is the first launch country. In total, three different types
of third-stage equilibrium payoffs are to be considered, each of which is the
result of one of the following processes.
• Independent price negotiations: The prices in the two countries are
determined through two independent Nash bargaining games; this is
the case in subgames 1, 2, 4, and 5.
• The big country as benchmark for the small country: The price for
both countries is determined through a Nash bargaining game between
the firm and agency A; this is the case in subgames 3 and 7.
• The small country as benchmark for the big country: The price for
both countries is determined through a Nash bargaining game between
the firm and agency B; this is the case in subgames 6 and 8.
Independent price negotiations. We first derive the equilibrium payoffs
for those subgames where (at least) the second launch country is bound to a
DPN policy and thus both agencies play independent Nash bargaining games
with the firm (subgames 1, 2, 4, and 5).
In both Nash games the negotiating agency aims to maximize the surplus
for domestic consumers, while the firm aims to maximize its profits from
sales to these consumers. In absence of an agreement, net consumer surplus
and profits are both zero.11 Therefore, zero is the threat point for both,
the negotiating agency and the pharmaceutical firm. The Nash bargained
prices in country A and B are found from the solutions to the following
11This assumes that the agency can prevent the consumers in its country from purchasing
the drug in the other country in the event an agreement is not reached. We believe that
this assumption is in accordance with reality, especially in countries that do not allow
parallel imports of pharmaceutical products.
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maximization problems.
max
PA
[
CS(PA)
]α[
Π(PA)
]1−α
= max
PA
[
(1− PA)
2
2
]α[
(1− PA)PA
]1−α
(4)
and
max
PB
[
k CS(PB)
]β[
kΠ(PB)
]1−β
= max
PB
[
k(1− PB)
2
2
]β[
k(1− PB)PB
]1−β
, (5)
Note that country size is only a level effect in these maximization problems,
and in consequence will not affect the final result. By solving (4) and (5) we
obtain the first lemma.
Lemma 1. When both countries independently negotiate the drug price with
the firm, then the price in the big and the small country is
P ∗A =
1− α
2
and P ∗B =
1− β
2
.
Total profits for the pharmaceutical firm are
Π∗Total = Π(P
∗
A) + kΠ(P
∗
B) =
1− α2
4
+
k(1− β2)
4
,
and the net consumer surplus in the big and the small country is
CS∗A =
(1 + α)2
8
and CS∗B =
k(1 + β)2
8
, respectively.
Remark. Since α > β, we find that the negotiated price in country A is lower
than the negotiated price in country B, i.e. P ∗A < P
∗
B. This implies that the
per capita surplus in the big country exceeds the per capita surplus in the
small country. Expecting this result, the legislator in the small country may
therefore have an incentive to implement an EPB policy.
12
The big country as benchmark for the small country. Next we focus
on subgames where the negotiated price in the big country becomes the price
in the small country as well (subgames 3 and 7).
Provided that B is bound to an EBP policy and A is the first-launch
country, the price for both countries is determined through a Nash bargain-
ing game between the firm and agency A. Since in this Nash game, price
concessions are much more costly—compared to the independent price ne-
gotiations case—we should expect the firm to drive a harder bargain with
agency A. As a result, the negotiated price will be higher and the net con-
sumer surplus in country A will be lower.
The firm’s surplus from reaching an agreement with agency A is given by
(1 + k)Π(PA)− kΠ(P
∗
B). In this expression the first term reflects the profits
from sales in both markets (given that B takes the negotiated price as price
cap) and the second term reflects the firm’s threat point of only selling in
market B. The Nash bargained price is the solution to the following problem:
max
PA
[
CS(PA)
]α[
(1 + k)Π(PA)− kΠ(P
∗
B)
]1−α
= max
PA
[
(1− PA)
2
2
]α[
(1 + k)(1− PA)PA −
k(1− β2)
4
]1−α
. (6)
Note that problem (6) is identical to problem (4), except that the term
kΠ(P ∗B) is implicit in problem (4). Under independent price negotiations,
the expected profits from sales in country B are always kΠ(P ∗B), whether
or not the firm reaches an agreement with agency A. Accordingly, the term
kΠ(P ∗B) can be netted out of problem (4). If, however, the negotiated price
in country A is the price cap for country B, then the profits from sales in
country B depend upon the Nash bargaining game in country A. As a result,
kΠ(P ∗B) cannot be netted out of the expression in problem (6). Lemma 2
summarizes the outcome.
Lemma 2. When the small country is bound to an EPB policy and the big
country is the first-launch country, then the drug price in both countries is
P
AB
→ =
3− α−X
4
, where X =
√
(1 + α)2 −
4α k(1− β2)
k + 1
.
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Total profits for the pharmaceutical firm are
Π
AB
→
Total =
(1 + k)(3− α−X)(1 + α +X)
16
and the net consumer surplus in the big and the small country is
CS
AB
→
A =
(1 + α +X)2
32
and CS
AB
→
B =
k(1 + α+X)2
32
, respectively.
Remark. Straight forward comparison reveals that P
AB
→ > P ∗A. This confirms
our conjecture that the net consumer surplus in the big country decreases
due to an EPB policy in the small country. The reason for this result is
the general rule that the introduction of an EPB policy in the second-launch
country increases the threat point for the firm in the Nash game with the first
agency: the firm’s outside option is no longer zero; instead, it is determined
by the expected profits from sales in the second-launch country.
Obviously, the small country is better off under an EPB policy, compared
to independent price negotiations, if CS
AB
→ ≥ CS∗B. Straight forward cal-
culations (given in the Appendix), reveal that this inequality is satisfied iff
β < α/ (1 + k(1− α)).
The small country as benchmark for the big country. Finally, we are
left with the case where the negotiated price in the small country becomes
the price for the big country as well (subgames 6 and 8).
Provided that A is bound to an EBP policy and B is the first-launch
country, the price for both countries is determined by the solution to
max
PB
[
k CS(PB)
]β[
(1 + k)Π(PB)− Π(P
∗
A)
]1−β
= max
PB
[
k(1− PB)
2
2
]β[
(1 + k)(1− PB)PB −
(1− α2)
4
]1−β
. (7)
By solving (7) we obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 3. When the big country is bound to an EPB policy and the small
country is the first-launch country, then the drug price in both countries is
P
BA
→ =
3− β − Y
4
, where Y =
√
(1 + β)2 −
4β(1− α2)
k + 1
.
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Total profits for the pharmaceutical firm are
Π
BA
→
Total =
(1 + k)(3− β − Y )(1 + β + Y )
16
and the net consumer surplus in the big and the small country is
CS
BA
→
A =
(1 + β + Y )2
32
and CS
BA
→
B =
k(1 + β + Y )2
32
, respectively.
Remark. Price comparisons show that P
BA
→ > P ∗B > P
∗
A. From this we can
conclude that all consumers are worse off, compared to the case of indepen-
dent price negotiations, when the price for both countries is negotiated by
the agency in the small country. This is not an astonishing result as the
small country has the less powerful agency.
Lemmas 1 to 3 fully characterize the outcome for all third stage subgames.
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium payoffs.
Table 1: Subgame equilibrium payoffs for different strategy combinations
“A/B” “B/A”
Country A: “DPN”
Country B: “DPN”
(
CS∗A, CS
∗
B,Π
∗
Total
)
Subgame 3.1
(
CS∗A, CS
∗
B,Π
∗
Total
)
Subgame 3.2
Country A: “DPN”
Country B: “EPB”
(
CS
AB
→
A , CS
AB
→
B ,Π
AB
→
Total
)
Subgame 3.3
(
CS∗A, CS
∗
B,Π
∗
Total
)
Subgame 3.4
Country A: “EPB”
Country B: “DPN”
(
CS∗A, CS
∗
B,Π
∗
Total
)
Subgame 3.5
(
CS
BA
→
A , CS
BA
→
B ,Π
BA
→
Total
)
Subgame 3.6
Country A: “EPB”
Country B: “EPB”
(
CS
AB
→
A , CS
AB
→
B ,Π
AB
→
Total
)
Subgame 3.7
(
CS
BA
→
A , CS
BA
→
B ,Π
BA
→
Total
)
Subgame 3.8
The payoffs for the different combinations of price approval policies and product launch
strategies are defined in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
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4 Product Launch Strategies
We now focus on the second stage where the pharmaceutical firm chooses
its product launch strategy. Observing the price approval policies in the two
countries, the firm has to decide whether to launch the drug first in the big
country, followed by introduction in the the small country, or vice versa.
Calculations given in the Appendix reveal that the firms’s total profits
are highest when the big country is bound to an EPB policy and thus takes
the negotiated price from the small country as price cap. Conversely, total
profits are lowest if both countries carry independent price negotiations with
the firm. That is, the firm’s expected profits from the subgames in stage
three are ordered as follows:
Π
BA
→
Total > Π
AB
→
Total > Π
∗
Total. (8)
This payoff ordering implies that, whenever possible, the firm should decide
on a product launch strategy that leads to a price cap: in particular, the firm
should launch the drug first in the small country, followed by introduction in
the big country, when the big country is bound to an EPB policy. Lemma 4
further characterizes the optimal strategy.
Lemma 4. The firm has the following subgame-perfect strategy profile for
stage two: “B/A” if agency A is bound to an EPB policy, and “A/B” other-
wise.
Remark. It is not very surprising that profits are highest when the weak
agency B negotiates the price for both countries. However, it is less obvious
that profits are lowest under independent price negotiations. The reason is
that implementing an EPB policy in the small country reinforces the bar-
gaining position of the firm in the Nash game with the big country. As a
result, profits rise on sales in the big country, but they probably fall on sales
in the small country. Nevertheless, in the case of linear demand, the first
effect always outweighs the second and, thus, total profits increase under
external benchmarking.
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5 Price Approval Policies
In this section, we analyze the first-stage game where the legislators of both
countries simultaneously define the price approval policy for their country.
It is straightforward to show that the implementation of an EPB policy
is a weakly dominated strategy for legislator A. We show in the Appendix
that the three possible payoffs for country A are ordered as follows:
CS∗A > CS
AB
→
A > CS
BA
→
A .
From this payoff ordering follows that the big country is better off under
independent price negotiations than under any form of external price bench-
marking: in fact, domestic consumers are worst off if agency A is committed
to accept the negotiated drug price from country B. Obviously, legislator A
can prevent this outcome by deciding on a DPN policy. This suggests the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. In the first stage, the legislator of the big country A always decides
on a DPN policy.
As to the payoffs for the small country B, we show in the Appendix that
CS
AB
→
B > CS
∗
B > CS
BA
→
B if 0 < β < β̂,
and CS∗B > CS
AB
→
B > CS
BA
→
B if β̂ < β < α,
where β̂ = α
1+k(1−α)
. This allows the following statement. Provided that
agency B has considerably less bargaining power than agency A, it is prefer-
able for the small country to rely on an EPB policy; however, if the difference
in bargaining power is small, then it is beneficial to implement a DPN policy.
The optimal strategy for legislator B is summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 6. Let β̂ := α
1+k(1−α)
. In the first stage, the legislator of the small
country B implements an EPB policy if β < β̂ and a DPN policy otherwise.
Remark. The cutoff β̂ is decreasing in k. This means that, ceteris paribus,
the small country is less likely to implement an EPB policy when its popu-
lation grows. The reason for this result is the fact that under independent
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price negotiations an increase in k leads to an increase in the firm’s profits
accrued in the small country. Since these profits represent the firm’s outside
option in the bargaining problem (6), the negotiated price under external
benchmarking increases as well. Therefore, under an EPB policy the per
capita surplus in country B decreases as the population grows.
The equilibrium outcome of the model follows from Lemmas 1 to 6. Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 summarize the results.
Proposition 1. Provided that the small country has considerably less bar-
gaining power than the big country, i.e., 0 < β < β̂, the equilibrium path of
the model is as follows:
1. Legislator A implements a DPN policy and legislator B implements an
EPB policy.
2. The firm decides to launch the drug first in the big country A, followed
by introduction in the small country B.
3. First, the drug price for the big market is determined through a Nash
bargaining game between the firm and agency A and agency B then
adopts this price as cap for the small market; i.e. PA = PB = P
AB
→ .
Proposition 2. Provided that the small country has only slightly less bar-
gaining power than the big country, i.e., β̂ < β < α, the equilibrium path of
the model is as follows:
1. Both legislators implement a DPN policy.
2. The firm decides to launch the drug first in the big country A, followed
by introduction in the small country B.
3. First, the drug price for the big market is determined through a Nash
bargaining game between the firm and agency A; then, the drug price
for the small market is determined through a Nash bargaining game
between the firm and agency B; i.e. PA = P
∗
A and PB = P
∗
B.
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Remark. Note that our results also hold for k = 1 This implies that, provided
that one country has considerably less bargaining power than the other,
external price benchmarking may also occur if countries are similar in size.
However, in this case, the difference in bargaining power should be explained
by other factors, such as the degree of centralization of health care financing
or the importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the national economy.
On the one hand, countries with more centralized health care systems, such
as the United Kingdom, should be expected to be more likely to exercise
monopsony power in the pharmaceutical market than other countries. On
the other hand, countries headquartering major pharmaceutical companies,
such as Switzerland, seem to be less tough in drug price negotiations due to
a constant lobbying from the industry.
6 Conclusion
The present model characterizes external price benchmarking as an effective
policy to regulate pharmaceutical prices. Our analysis demonstrates that a
country may adopt such a policy to free ride on superior negotiating skills
of other countries. Since a big country has more resources to finance a reg-
ulatory agency than a small country, we assume that a big country also has
more bargaining power in price negotiations with a pharmaceutical firm. Us-
ing a model where two countries only differ in their market size, we show
that the smaller country engages in external price benchmarking if its reg-
ulatory agency has considerably less bargaining power than the agency in
the big country. This preference dwindles when the population in the small
country grows. We find that the big country never engages in external price
benchmarking; indeed, any form of benchmarking harms the big country.
Our model removes the presumption that pharmaceutical profits will au-
tomatically fall if prices are regulated with an external benchmarking policy.
The implementation of such a policy in the small country causes the firm to
drive a harder bargain in negotiations with the agency of the big country.
As a result, profits rise on sales in the big country. However, profits fall on
sales in the small country because the small country has only an incentive to
engage in external price benchmarking if the new price is lower than the in-
19
dependently negotiated price. We find that in the case of linear demand, the
first effect dominates the second and total profits always rise. Why, in light
of this result, do pharmaceutical firms oppose to external price benchmark-
ing policies? There are a couple of issues that should be addressed in future
research. First, pharmaceutical firms are active in many different countries
and in some of these countries there are incentives to engage in price discrim-
ination. External price benchmarking destroys the ability of these firms to
engage in price discrimination. Second, our results crucially depend on the
linear demand assumption. There might be other demand specifications for
which profits would not rise under external price benchmarking.
However, in summary we can conclude that external price benchmarking
is an effective policy for small countries to regulate pharmaceutical prices.
This theoretical result is in line with the finding of a recent OECD report
(2008), stating that Germany and the United Kingdom do not engage in
external price benchmarking, but are often first- or early-launch countries.
Together with France, these are also the three countries most commonly
referenced by other European countries.
Appendix
Comparison of profits. According to Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 the firm has
the following possible payoffs:
Π∗Total =
1− α2
4
+
k(1− β2)
4
, (9)
Π
AB
→
Total =
(1 + k)(3− α−X)(1 + α +X)
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, and (10)
Π
BA
→
Total =
(1 + k)(3− β − Y )(1 + β + Y )
16
, (11)
where X =
√
(1 + α)2 − 4α k(1−β
2)
k+1
and Y =
√
(1 + β)2 − 4β(1−α
2)
k+1
.
For the comparison it is useful to memorize that
1− α < X < 1 + α, 1− β < Y < 1 + β and Y < X.
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This results follow directly from the facts that 0 < β < α < 1 and 0 < k < 1
by assumption.
Now subtract (10) from (11) and simplify to find that Π
BA
→
Total −Π
AB
→
Total has the
same sign as (X − Y + α− β) (X − (1− α) + Y − (1− β)) > 0.
Similarly, subtract (9) from (10) and simplify to find that Π
AB
→
Total −Π
∗
Total has
the same sign as α2 + 2αβ2 + β2 + k(β2 − β4) > 0.
As a result we obtain the following ordering of total profits:
Π
BA
→
Total > Π
AB
→
Total > Π
∗
Total. (12)
Comparison of the consumer surplus in the big country. According
to Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, possible payoffs to country A are
CS∗A =
(1 + α)2
8
, (13)
CS
AB
→
A =
(1 + α+X)2
32
, and (14)
CS
BA
→
A =
(1 + β + Y )2
32
. (15)
First, subtract (14) from (13) and simplify to find that the sign of CS∗A − CS
AB
→
A
is the same as the sign of 1 + α−X > 0.
Second, subtract (15) from (14) and simplify to see that CS
AB
→
A − CS
BA
→
A has
the same sign as X − Y + α− β > 0.
As a result we obtain the following ordering of the net consumer surplus in
the big country A:
CS∗A > CS
AB
→
A > CS
BA
→
A . (16)
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Comparison of the consumer surplus in the small country. Accord-
ing to Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, possible payoffs to country B are
CS∗B =
k(1 + β)2
8
, (17)
CS
AB
→
B =
k(1 + α+X)2
32
, and (18)
CS
BA
→
B =
k(1 + β + Y )2
32
. (19)
First, subtract (19) from (17) and simplify to find that the sign of CS∗B − CS
BA
→
B
is the same as the sign of 1 + β − Y > 0.
Second, subtract (19) from (18) and simplify to see that CS
AB
→
B − CS
BA
→
B has
the same sign as X − Y + α− β > 0.
Third, subtract (17) from (18) and simplify to find that CS
AB
→
B −CS
∗
B has the
same sign as α− β (1 + k(1− α)) , which is positive if β < α
1+k(1−α)
.
As a result we obtain the following ordering of the net consumer surplus in
the small country B:
CS
AB
→
B > CS
∗
B > CS
BA
→
B if 0 < β <
α
1+k(1−α)
,
CS
AB
→
B = CS
∗
B > CS
BA
→
B if β =
α
1+k(1−α)
,
CS∗B > CS
AB
→
B > CS
BA
→
B if
α
1+k(1−α)
< β < α.
(20)
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